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Abstract
In this work, we consider an interesting variant of the well studied KP model for selﬁsh routing on parallel links, which reﬂects
some inﬂuence from the much older Wardrop model [J.G. Wardrop, Some theoretical aspects of road trafﬁc research, Proc. Inst.
of Civil Eng. Part II 1 (1956) 325–378]. In the new model, user trafﬁcs are still unsplittable and links are identical. Social cost is
now the expectation of the sum, over all links, of latency costs; each latency cost is modeled as a certain polynomial latency cost
function evaluated at the latency incurred by all users choosing the link. The resulting social cost is called polynomial social cost, or
monomial social cost when the latency cost function is a monomial. All considered polynomials are of degree d, where d2, and
have non-negative coefﬁcients.
We are interested in evaluating Nash equilibria in this model, and we use the monomial price of anarchy (MPoA) and the
polynomial price of anarchy (PPoA) as our evaluation measures. Through establishing some remarkable relations of these costs and
measures to some classical combinatorial numbers such as the Stirling numbers of the second kind and the Bell numbers, we obtain
a multitude of results:
• For the special case of identical users:
◦ The fully mixed Nash equilibrium, where all probabilities are strictly positive, maximizes polynomial social cost.
◦ The MPoA is no more than Bd , the Bell number of order d.
This immediately implies that the PPoA is no more than
∑
1 t d Bt .
For the special case of two links, the MPoA is no more than 2d−2(1 + (1/n)d−1), and this bound is tight for n = 2.
• The MPoA is exactly ((2d − 1)d/(d − 1)(2d − 2)d−1)((d − 1)/d)d for pure Nash equilibria. This immediately implies that the
PPoA is no more than
∑
2 t d ((2t − 1)t /(t − 1)(2t − 2)t−1)((t − 1)/t)t .
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1. Introduction
1.1. Framework
The price of anarchy [19,25], also known as coordination ratio, is a widely adopted measure of the extent to which
competition approximates cooperation. In the most general setting, the price of anarchy is the worst-case ratio between
the value of a global objective function called social cost [19] over its optimal value, called optimum. The social cost
is evaluated at a Nash equilibrium [23,24]; here, no user could unilaterally switch from its own (mixed) strategy in
order to improve the value of its local objective function, called (expected) individual cost.Yet, optimum is the solution
to some, usually hard, combinatorial optimization problem. So, the price of anarchy represents a rendezvous of Nash
equilibrium, a fundamental concept from game theory, with approximation, an ubiquitous concept from theoretical
computer science.
Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [19] introduced the price of anarchy in the context of some speciﬁc setting, widely
known as the KP model and extensively studied in the last few years as a prevailing model for selﬁsh routing (see, e.g.,
[10,11,13,15,16,18,21,22,]). In the KP model, there are m parallel links and n selﬁsh users with (unsplittable) trafﬁcs.
The (expected) latency incurred on a link is the (expected) total trafﬁc of users choosing it. The (expected) individual
cost of a user is the (expected) latency on the link it chooses. In a Nash equilibrium, each user alone is minimizing its
(expected) individual cost. The social cost is the expectation of maximum latency; the optimum is the least possible
maximum latency.
The Wardrop model [29] is another prevailing model for selﬁsh routing that dates back to the 1950s, when it was
considered in the context of road trafﬁc networks. In the Wardrop model, the network can be arbitrary; user trafﬁcs are
inﬁnitesimally splittable, and this rules out mixed strategies from consideration. In addition, social cost is deﬁned here
as the sum of all individual costs; each individual cost is a certain sum of latency costs. More speciﬁcally, the latency
cost on a link is determined by a convex function, called latency cost function, of the latency on the link; the individual
cost of a user is the sum of latency costs on links in the paths chosen by the user. Inspired by the vivid interest in the
price of anarchy, Roughgarden and Tardos [27] initiated recently a reinvestigation of the Wardrop model.
1.2. The model and its relatives
A natural goal is to understand the dependence of the price of anarchy on the particular way of formulating individual
cost and social cost. Towards this goal, some recent works [14,20] have considered bridging the KP model with the
Wardrop model and analyzing the bridged model. In this paper, we further pursue this goal by introducing and analyzing
a new, interesting variant of the KP model that reﬂects some inﬂuence from the Wardrop model.
In our proposed model, we follow the KP model to consider the parallel links network, unsplittable trafﬁcs, and
mixed strategies. However, inspired by the Wardrop model, we introduce polynomial social cost as the expectation
of the sum of latency costs on links. We also assume that latency cost functions are polynomial; all polynomials we
consider are of degree d and have non-negative coefﬁcients. We assume that links are identical; so, all polynomials
are identical. polynomial social cost gives rise to polynomial optimum and polynomial price of anarchy (PPoA) in the
natural way. In some cases, we also consider monomials (that is, polynomials consisting of a single power with unit
coefﬁcient). We then talk about monomial social cost, monomial optimum, and monomial price of anarchy (MPoA).
Our model is closely related to two previously studied models:
• Relaxed to allow arbitrary links with (not necessarily identical) linear latencies, but restricted to quadratic latency
cost functions, our model has been already studied by Lücking et al. [20]. The model in [20] adopted quadratic
social cost, which it deﬁned (in an equivalent way) as the sum of weighted (expected) individual costs. Quadratic
social cost is the special case of our monomial social cost with monomials of degree 2.
• Relaxed to allow arbitrary links with (not necessarily identical) convex latencies, our model was already studied
by Gairing et al. [14]. However, Gairing et al. [14] modeled social cost as the sum of individual costs. Assuming
identical users and linear latencies, the model of Gairing et al. [14] and the model of Lücking et al. [20] become
identical.
The relation of our model to the KP model and the models of Lücking et al. [20] and Gairing et al. [14] is summarized
in Fig. 1. Restricted to pure Nash equilibria, where each user chooses a single link (with probability 1), our model was
already studied for monotone latency cost functions in [9]. Besides pure Nash equilibria, we shall pay, in our study,
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Fig. 1. Comparison of present model to three relatives (namely, the KP model [19] and the models in [14,20]). Note that all four models formulate
individual cost (as a function of latency) in the same way, while they do not (in general) do so for latency. In the special case where the linear function
for latency in the KP model and the model of Lücking et al. [20] becomes the identity function, the individual costs for these models become identical
with the one for the present model, as also do their Nash equilibria.
some particular attention to the fully mixed Nash equilibrium [22], where each user chooses each link with non-zero
probability.
Admittedly, our proposed model represents a signiﬁcant departure from a long line of previous work (includ-
ing [10,14,18,20,22,27]). The reason is that, for the ﬁrst time, the social cost is not a simple and natural function
(for example, sum or maximum) of either the individual costs of the users or the latencies on the links. Thus, while
the (expected) individual cost is still the conditional expectation of the link latency, the latency cost on a link (which
is what contributes to social cost) is now an (almost) arbitrary polynomial of the link latency. We argue, however, that
our proposed model is signiﬁcant and has potential applications in some economic scenario:
• First, arbitrary polynomials have been long used for modeling latency costs in the context of studying communication
and transportation networks—see, for eg., [2,6].
• Second and at a more abstract level, recall that latency costs represent costs to the society, while individual costs
represent costs to the individuals (making up the society). It is often the case that individuals receive support from
some authority—for example, individuals count on refunds from the tax authority. This is best modeled by assuming
that the actual individual costs are signiﬁcantly lower than those corresponding to the social cost.
• Third, social cost is often overestimated in order to allow claims for higher support from funding agencies. Using
higher degree polynomials provides a paradigm for such overestimation.
1.3. Contribution and signiﬁcance
We are primarily interested in analyzing the PPoA for our new model. To do so, we introduce and study a natural
conjecture, called the polynomial fully mixed Nash equilibrium conjecture and abbreviated as the PFMNE conjecture;
it asserts that the fully mixed Nash equilibrium maximizes polynomial social cost. Although the PFMNE conjecture
is interesting in its own right, a resolution of it to the positive would also enable the derivation of upper bounds on the
PPoA via deriving upper bounds on the polynomial social cost of the fully mixed Nash equilibrium.
We address two important special settings of the problem:
1.3.1. Identical users
For the case of identical users, we rely on a very thorough analysis of the fully mixed Nash equilibrium. For the
analysis, we employ, as our chief combinatorial instrument, the binomial function originally introduced in [14]. We
prove here that the binomial function can be expressed as a combinatorial sumof Stirling numbers of the second kind [28]
(Proposition 2.2). We also observe that polynomial social cost can be expressed as a sum of binomial functions (in the
case of identical users). Together these two imply that the polynomial social cost of the fully mixed Nash equilibrium
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Fig. 2. Summary of shown bounds on monomial and polynomial prices of anarchy.
is a combinatorial sum of Stirling numbers of the second kind (Corollary 3.2). Moreover, the polynomial social cost
of any (mixed) Nash equilibrium is upper bounded by a certain combinatorial sum of Stirling numbers of the second
kind. Hence, comparison of these two polynomial social costs reduces to comparing like terms in the two combinatorial
sums. We obtain the following results:
• The PFMNE conjecture is valid (Theorem 4.1). The proof follows a careful comparison of like terms in the combi-
natorial sums upper bounding and expressing the polynomial social costs of an arbitrary and the fully mixed Nash
equilibria, respectively.
• The MPoA is upper bounded by Bd (Theorem 4.4); here, Bd is the Bell number of order d. This follows from the
PFMNE conjecture. From this bound, an upper bound of∑2 td Bt on PPoA follows immediately (Corollary 4.5).
For the special case of two links, the MPoA is upper bounded by 2d−2(1 + (1/n)d−1) (Theorem 4.6). Furthermore,
this upper bound is tight for the subcase of two users. From this upper bound, an upper bound of 2d−1−1+(d−1)/n
on PPoA follows immediately (Corollary 4.7).
1.3.2. Pure Nash equilibria
The MPoA is exactly ((2d − 1)d/(d − 1)(2d − 2)d−1)((d − 1)/d)d (Theorem 5.4). The asymptotic behavior of this
exact bound is closely described by the simple function (2d)d/d(2d)d−1 = 2d/d. From this exact bound, an upper
bound of
∑
2 td ((2t − 1)t /(t − 1)(2t − 2)t−1)((t − 1)/t)t on PPoA follows immediately (Corollary 5.5).
1.3.3. Summary and remarks
All shown bounds are summarized in Fig. 2. We remark that (almost) all shown bounds are independent of m and n,
but depend on d. The lower bounds imply that this dependence is inherent. Finally, we remark that all upper bounds on
PPoA are obtained through naive reductions to corresponding upper bounds on MPoA. At present, we do not know if
there are better bounds on PPoA that bypass the naive reduction.
1.4. Related work and comparison
Gairing et al. [15,16] were the ﬁrst to explicitly state the related fully mixed Nash equilibrium conjecture that the
fully mixed Nash equilibrium maximizes social cost for the KP model. Up to now, the conjecture has been proved for
several particular cases of the KP model [13,15,21]. Recently, Fischer and Vöcking [12] presented a counterexample
to the fully mixed Nash equilibrium conjecture for the case of identical links. The validity of the fully mixed Nash
equilibrium conjecture for the case of identical users (but arbitrary links) remains open.
Lücking et al. [20] formulated the quadratic fully mixed Nash equilibrium conjecture, which asserts that the fully
mixed Nash equilibrium maximizes quadratic social cost for their model. Lücking et al. [20, Theorem 4.8] proved the
quadratic fully mixed Nash equilibrium conjecture for the case of identical users and identical links. Our PFMNE
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conjecture generalizes the quadratic fully mixed Nash equilibrium conjecture of Lücking et al. [20] to polynomial
latency cost functions of arbitrary degree. Gairing et al. [14] also formulated a corresponding conjecture for their
model, stating that the fully mixed Nash equilibrium maximizes social cost (sum of individual costs) for their model.
Gairing et al. [14, Theorem 3.5] proved their conjecture for the case of identical users and arbitrary links with non-
decreasing, non-constant, and convex latencies.
Our exact bound on MPoA for pure Nash equilibria includes, as the special case with d = 2, the exact bound of 98
on quadratic price of anarchy for pure Nash equilibria shown in [20, Theorem 5.2]. Our proof generalizes the one for
[20, Theorem 5.2].
Our upper bound of 2d−2(1 + (1/n)d−1) on MPoA for the case of identical users and two (identical) links implies,
as the special case where d = 2, an upper bound of 1 + 1/n 32 on quadratic price of anarchy. This complements the
corresponding exact bound of 43 shown in [20, Theorem 5.1] for the case of identical users and pure Nash equilibria(but for arbitrarily many related links).
Our upper bound of Bd for the case of identical users implies, as the special case where d = 2, an upper bound of
B2 = 2. The implied upper bound exceeds the corresponding upper bound of 1 + min{(m − 1)/n, (n − 1)/m} < 2 on
quadratic price of anarchy shown in [20, Theorem 5.4]. So, our upper bound of Bd for the case of identical users is not
tight for the particular case where d = 2.
Other bounds on price of anarchy include tight asymptotic bounds (depending on m) for the KP model [10,18]
and exact constant bounds for the Wardrop model [27]. Some recent works [1,4,7,8] have provided tight (and even
exact) bounds on price of anarchy for congestion games [26] and their variants. (The KP model is itself a special case
of congestion games.) These works have considered both Nash and correlated equilibria [3], linear and polynomial
latencies, and different social cost functions.
1.5. Road map
Section 2 summarizes some mathematical preliminaries. Section 3 introduces our theoretical model. The case of
identical users is considered in Section 4. Pure Nash equilibria are treated in Section 5. We conclude, in Section 6, with
a discussion of our results and some open problems.
2. Mathematical preliminaries
Throughout, denote for any integer k1, [k] = {1, . . . , k}.A monomial function g : R → R has the form g() = d
for some integer d0.A polynomial function is a linear combination of monomials.We shall only consider polynomial
functions with non-negative coefﬁcients. For a random variable X with associated probability distribution P, denote
as EP(X) the expectation of X. In some later proof, we shall make use of the following simple mathematical fact that
follows directly from the convexity of the monomial function d() = d .
Lemma 2.1. Let x, y1, y2 ∈ R with 0 < xy1 < y2 + x. Then, for each integer d2,
(y1 − x)d + (y2 + x)d > yd1 + yd2 .
2.1. Falling factorials, Stirling numbers and Bell numbers
For any pair of integers k1 and t1, the falling factorial of k order t, denoted as kt , is given by kt =
k · (k − 1) · . . . · (k − (t − 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
t factors
, when k t . Otherwise (tk + 1), kt = 0.
For any pair of integers d1 and t ∈ [d] ∪ {0}, the Stirling number of the second kind, denoted as S(d, t), counts
the number of partitions of a set with d elements into exactly t blocks (non-empty subsets). In particular, S(d, 1) = 1.
Also, for all integers d2, S(d, 2) = 2d−1 − 1. Stirling numbers of the second kind satisfy the recurrence relation
S(d, t) = ∑
q: tqd−1
(
d − 1
q − 1
)
· S(q − 1, t − 1)
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for all integers d2 and t ∈ [d] (see, e.g., [17, Table 265, Identity (6.15)]). It is also known that for all integers d2
and k1, kd = ∑t∈[d] S(d, t) · kt .
For any integer d1, the Bell number of order d [5], denoted as Bd , counts the number of partitions of a set with d
elements into blocks. So, clearly, B0 = 1 and Bd = ∑t∈[d] S(d, t).
2.2. Binomial function
We start with the deﬁnition of a binomial function [14, Deﬁnition 1].
Deﬁnition 2.1. For any integer r1, consider a vector of probabilitiesp = 〈p1, . . . , pr 〉. Fix a function g() : R → R.
Then, the binomial function BF(p, g) is given by
BF(p, g) = ∑
A⊆[r]
(∏
k∈A
pk · ∏
k /∈A
(1 − pk) · g(|A|)
)
.
Strictly speaking, Deﬁnition 2.1 deﬁnes a functional. If all probabilities have the same value p, then we talk about a
constant vector of probabilities, and we (abuse notation to) write BF(p, r, g). Clearly, in this case,
BF(p, r, g) = ∑
0k r
(
r
k
)
pk(1 − p)r−kg(k).
We show that when g is monomial, the binomial function takes a special form.
Proposition 2.2. For each integer d1,
BF(p, r, d) = ∑
t∈[d]
pt · S(d, t) · rt .
Proof. The proof will ﬁrst establish a recurrence relation for BF(p, r, d). This relation will then become instrumental
for carrying out an inductive proof of the claim. We continue with the details of the formal proof. Clearly,
BF(p, r, d)
= ∑
k∈[r]
(
r
k
)
pk(1 − p)r−kkd (by deﬁnition of binomial function)
= ∑
k∈[r]
r
k
(
r−1
k−1
)
pk(1 − p)r−kkd
(
since
(
r
k
) = r
k
(
r−1
k−1
))
= p · r · ∑
k∈[r]
(
r−1
k−1
)
pk−1(1 − p)r−kkd−1
= p · r · ∑
0k r−1
(
r−1
k
)
pk(1 − p)r−1−k(k + 1)d−1 (by change of variable)
= p · r · ∑
0k r−1
(
r−1
k
)
pk(1 − p)r−1−k
( ∑
0qd−1
(
d−1
q
)
kq
)
(by the binomial theorem)
= p · r · ∑
0qd−1
(
d−1
q
) ( ∑
0k r−1
(
r−1
k
)
pk(1 − p)r−1−kkq
)
(by changing order of summation)
= p · r · ∑
0qd−1
(
d−1
q
)
BF(p, r − 1, q) (by deﬁnition of binomial function).
We now use the obtained recurrence relation for the binomial function to prove the claim by induction on r. For the
basis case, let r = 1. Then, BF(p, 1, d) = (11)p11d = p and ∑t∈[d] ptS(d, t)1t = p1S(d, 1)11 = p, so that the
claim follows.
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Assume inductively that the claim holds for some integer r − 11. For the induction step, note that
BF(p, r, d)
= p · r · (d−10 )BF(p, r − 1, 1) + p · r · ∑
q∈[d−1]
(
d−1
q
)
BF(p, r − 1, q) (by recurrence relation)
= p · r + p · r · ∑
q∈[d−1]
(
d−1
q
)
BF(p, r − 1, q) (by deﬁnition of binomial function)
= p · r + p · r · ∑
q∈[d−1]
(
d−1
q
) ( ∑
t∈[q]
pt · S(q, t) · (r − 1)t
)
(by induction hypothesis)
= p · r + ∑
q∈[d−1]
(
d−1
q
) ( ∑
t∈[q]
pt+1 · S(q, t) · rt+1
)
= p · r + ∑
t∈[d−1]
pt+1 · rt+1 ·
( ∑
q:tqd−1
(
d−1
q
) · S(q, t)) (by changing order of summation)
= p · r + ∑
2 td
pt · rt ·
( ∑
q:tqd
(
d−1
q−1
) · S(q − 1, t − 1)) (by change of variables)
= p · r + ∑
2 td
pt · rt · S(d, t) (by recurrence relation for S(d, t))
= ∑
t∈[d]
pt · rt · S(d, t) (since S(d, 1) = 1)
as needed. 
Proposition 2.2 implies that for a constant vector of probabilities and a monomial function, the binomial function is
a combinatorial sum of Stirling numbers of the second kind.
It is known [14, Lemma 3] that in case g is convex, the binomial function does not decrease when replacing all
probabilities in the vector of probabilities p by the average probability p˜ = ∑i∈[r] pi/r .
Lemma 2.3 (Gairing et al. [14]). For a convex function g, BF(p, g)BF(p˜, r, g).
3. Model and preliminaries
Our model deﬁnitions are built on top of those for the KP model [19], which are extended to accommodate some
features from the Wardrop model [29].
3.1. General
We consider a simple network consisting of a set of m parallel links 1, 2, . . . , m from a source node to a destination
node. Each of n users 1, 2, . . . , n wishes to route a trafﬁc along a (non-ﬁxed) link from source to destination. Denote
as wi the trafﬁc of user i ∈ [n]; denote W = ∑i∈[n] wi . Deﬁne the n×1 trafﬁc vector w in the natural way. We assume
that all links are identical. Thus, an instance is a tuple 〈w,m〉. In the model of identical users, all trafﬁcs are equal to 1.
In that case, an instance is a pair 〈n,m〉. Assume throughout that m2 and n2.
The latency  on a link is the total trafﬁc on it. Associated with each link is a latency cost function, which is a
polynomial d() = ∑0 td att of degree d2 with non-negative coefﬁcients. In the special case of a monomial,
d() = d . The latency cost for latency  on the link is given by d().
3.2. Strategies and assignments
A pure strategy for user i ∈ [n] is some speciﬁc link. A mixed strategy for user i ∈ [n] is a probability distribution
over pure strategies; so, it is a probability distribution over links.
A pure assignment is an n-tuple L = 〈1, 2, . . . , n〉 ∈ [m]n; a mixed assignment is an n × m probability matrix
P of nm probabilities pij , with i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m], where pij is the probability that user i chooses link j. Note that
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a mixed assignment induces a probability distribution on the set of pure assignments. For each link j ∈ [m], denote
rj = |{i ∈ [n] | pij > 0}|. Consider now a link j ∈ [m] such that rj > 0. Then, the average probability p̂j on link j is
p˜j = ∑i∈[n] pij /rj . A mixed assignment P is fully mixed [22, Section 2.2] if for all users i ∈ [n] and links j ∈ [m],
pij > 0.
Fix now a mixed assignment P. The latency j (P) on link j ∈ [m] induced by P is the total trafﬁc assigned to
the link according to P; so, j (P) is a random variable. Denote as j (P) the expected latency on link j ∈ [m]; thus,
j (P) = EP(j (P)) = ∑i∈[n] pijwi .
3.3. Cost measures
3.3.1. Individual cost and expected individual cost
For a pure assignmentL, the individual cost for user i ∈ [n], denoted as ICi (L), is ICi (L) = i (L); so, the individual
cost for a user is the latency of the link it chooses. For a mixed assignment P, the expected individual cost for user
i ∈ [n], denoted again as ICi (P), is the expectation according to P of the individual cost for the user.
The conditional expected individual cost ICij (P) for user i ∈ [n] on link j ∈ [m] is the conditional expectation
according to P of the individual cost of user i had it been assigned to link j. So, ICij (P) = j (P) + (1 − pij )wi .
Clearly, for each user i ∈ [n], ICi (P) = ∑j∈[m] pij ICij (P).
3.3.2. Polynomial social cost
Associated with an instance 〈w,m〉, a latency cost function d(), and a mixed assignment P is the polynomial social
cost, denoted asPSCd ()(w,m,P), which is the expectation of the sum of latency costs; so, by linearity of expectation,
PSCd ()(w,m,P) = EP
( ∑
j∈[m]
d
( ∑
k∈[n]|k=j
wk
))
= ∑
j∈[m]
EP
(
d
( ∑
k∈[n]|k=j
wk
))
= ∑
j∈[m]
∑
A⊆[n]
(∏
i∈A
pij
)(∏
i /∈A
(1 − pij )
)
d
( ∑
k∈A|k=j
wk
)
.
The displayed formulas for polynomial social cost refer to a pure assignment L = 〈1, . . . , n〉 drawn according to the
probability distribution (on the set of pure assignments) induced by the mixed assignment P. Note that
PSCd ()(w,m,P) =
∑
0 td
at · PSCt (w,m,P).
So, polynomial social cost is a linear combination (with non-negative coefﬁcients) of monomial social costs. This
property will later reduce the comparison of the polynomial social costs of two different assignments to the pairwise
comparison of their monomial social costs.
We remark that the polynomial social cost is a generalization of the quadratic social cost [20] to latency cost functions
that are polynomials of arbitrary degree.
3.3.3. Polynomial optimum
Associated with an instance (w,m) and a latency cost function d() is the polynomial optimum, denoted as
POPTd ()(w,m), which is the least possible, over all pure assignments, polynomial social cost; thus,
POPTd ()(w,m) = minL∈[m]n PSCd ()(w,m,L).
A (pure) assignment L such that PSCd ()(w,m,L) = POPTd ()(w,m) will be called optimal (for the instance〈w,m〉 and the latency cost function d()).We remark that the polynomial optimum is a generalization of the quadratic
optimum [20] to latency cost functions that are polynomials of arbitrary degree. Monomial optimum is deﬁned as the
natural special case of polynomial optimum.
124 M. Gairing et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 369 (2006) 116–135
3.4. Nash equilibria
Given an instance 〈w,m〉, the mixed assignment P is a Nash equilibrium [19, Section 2] if for each user i ∈ [n], it
minimizes the expected individual cost ICi (P) over all mixed assignments Q that differ from P only with respect to the
mixed strategy of user i; that is, for all such mixed assignments Q, ICi (P) ICi (Q). Thus, in a Nash equilibrium, there
is no incentive for a user to unilaterally deviate from its mixed strategy.
We remark that latency and (expected) individual cost are deﬁned for our model in the same way they are deﬁned
for the KP model (and for the model of Lücking et al. [20] as well) in the case of identical links. Thus, the sets of Nash
equilibria for the two models coincide.
The particular deﬁnition of expected individual cost implies that in a Nash equilibrium, for each user i ∈ [n] and
link j ∈ [m] such that pij > 0, all conditional expected individual costs ICij (P) are the same and no more than any
conditional expected individual cost ICil(P) with pil = 0.
3.5. The fully mixed Nash equilibrium
For the KP model, it is known [22] that the fully mixed Nash equilibrium F exists uniquely in the case of identical
links (with fij = 1/m for all users i ∈ [m] and links j ∈ [m]). As the set of Nash equilibria in the KP model (in the
case of identical links) and the present model coincide, the same holds for the fully mixed Nash equilibria F in our
model.
We formulate a natural conjecture related to polynomial social costs of Nash equilibria in our model, called the
polynomial fully mixed Nash equilibrium conjecture and abbreviated as the PFMNE conjecture.
Conjecture 3.1 (PFMNE conjecture). For any instance 〈w,m〉 and associatedNash equilibriumP,PSCd ()(w,m,P)
PSCd ()(w,m,F).
The PFMNE conjecture generalizes the quadratic fully mixed Nash equilibrium conjecture to latency cost func-
tions that are polynomials of arbitrary degree. It is also a variant of the well-known fully mixed Nash equilibrium
conjecture [15,16] for the original KP model.
3.6. MPoA and PPoA
The polynomial price of anarchy, denoted as PPoA, is the worst-case ratio PSCd ()(w,m,P)/POPTd ()(w,m)
over all instances 〈w,m〉 and associated Nash equilibria P. This generalizes the quadratic price of anarchy [20] to
latency cost functions that are polynomials of arbitrary degree. The monomial price of anarchy, denoted as MPoA, is
the natural special case of the PPoA.
The following simple fact will be instrumental for reducing the PPoA for arbitrary polynomials (with non-negative
coefﬁcients) to the MPoA.
Lemma 3.1 (From polynomials to monomials). Fix any instance 〈w,m〉 with an associated Nash equilibrium P. Then,
PSCd ()(w,m,P)
POPTd ()(w,m)

∑
2 td
PSCt (w,m,P)
POPTt (w,m)
.
Proof. Our proof will use the expression of polynomial social cost as a linear combination of monomial social costs
(see Section 3.3.2). We will manipulate sums of fractions while relying on the non-negativeness of the coefﬁcients in
the latency cost function. We continue with the details of the formal proof. Let Q be an optimal assignment for the
instance 〈w,m〉. Then,
PSCd ()(w,m,P)
POPTd ()(w,m)
= PSCd ()(w,m,P)
PSCd ()(w,m,Q)
= a0 + a1 · PSC1(w,m,P) +
∑
2 td at · PSCt (w,m,P)
a0 + a1 · PSC1(w,m,Q) +
∑
2 td at · PSCt (w,m,Q)
.
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Note that PSC1(w,m,P) = PSC1(w,m,P) = W , so that a0 + a1 · PSC1(w,m,P) = a0 + a1 · PSC1(w,m,P).
Since Q is an optimal assignment, PSCd ()(w,m,P)PSCd ()(w,m,Q), which implies that
∑
2 td at · PSCt
(w,m,P)
∑
2 td at · PSCt (w,m,Q). Since a0 + a1 · PSC1(w,m,P) = a0 + a1 · PSC1(w,m,P)0, and we
consider polynomials with non-negative coefﬁcients, this implies that
a0 + a1 · PSC1(w,m,P) +
∑
2 td at · PSCt (w,m,P)
a0 + a1 · PSC1(w,m,Q) +
∑
2 td at · PSCt (w,m,Q)

∑
2 td at · PSCt (w,m,P)∑
2 td at · PSCt (w,m,Q)
=
∑
2 td|at>0 at · PSCt (w,m,P)∑
2 td|at>0 at · PSCt (w,m,Q)
.
Clearly, all terms at ·PSCt (w,m,P) and at ·PSCt (w,m,Q) in the last fraction are strictly positive, and this implies
that ∑
2 td|at>0 at · PSCt (w,m,P)∑
2 td|at>0 at · PSCt (w,m,Q)

∑
2 td|at>0
at · PSCt (w,m,P)
at · PSCt (w,m,Q)
= ∑
2 td|at>0
PSCt (w,m,P)
PSCt (w,m,Q)

∑
2 td
PSCt (w,m,P)
PSCt (w,m,Q)
.
By deﬁnition of monomial optimum, PSCt (w,m,Q)POPTt (w,m). Hence,∑
2 td
PSCt (w,m,P)
PSCt (w,m,Q)

∑
2 td
PSCt (w,m,P)
POPTt (w,m)
.
Combining all inequalities now yields the claim. 
3.7. Identical users
Restricted to identical users, polynomial social cost reduces to
PSCd ()(n,m,P) =
∑
j∈[m]
∑
A⊆[n]
(∏
i∈A
pij
)(∏
i /∈A
(1 − pij )
)
d(|A|) = ∑
j∈[m]
BF(〈p1j , . . . , pnj 〉, d()).
So, polynomial social cost is now a sum of binomial functions, one for each link. Recall that in the case of identical
users, all probabilities are identical (and equal to 1/m) for the fully mixed Nash equilibrium F. Hence, Proposition 2.2
implies now that the monomial social cost of the fully mixed Nash equilibrium F is a combinatorial sum of Stirling
numbers of the second kind.
Corollary 3.2. Consider the case of identical users. Fix an instance 〈n,m〉. Then,
PSCd (n,m,F) = m
∑
t∈[d]
(
1
m
)t
· S(d, t) · nt .
A lower bound on monomial optimum for the case of identical users is POPTd (w,m)m(n/m)
d if nm, while
POPTd (n,m) = n if n < m.
4. Identical users
The PFMNE conjecture is considered in Section 4.1. Bounds on the MPoA and PPoA are presented in Section 4.2.
4.1. The PFMNE conjecture
We prove the validity of the PFMNE conjecture.
Theorem 4.1. Consider the case of identical users. Then, the PFMNE conjecture is valid.
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Proof. Fix an instance 〈n,m〉with associatedNash equilibriumP and fullymixedNash equilibriumF. Since polynomial
social cost is a linear combination (with non-negative coefﬁcients) of monomial social costs, it sufﬁces to prove the
PFMNE conjecture for a monomial latency cost function d() = d .
Denote  = n/m. Assume, without loss of generality, that for each link j ∈ [m], rj = |{i ∈ [n] : pij > 0}|1.
Clearly, the average probability on link j is j (P)/rj .
We start with an informal outline of our proof. We will separately calculate the polynomial social costs of P and
F; we will express their difference as a linear combination (with non-negative coefﬁcients) of terms, and we will use
induction to prove that each term is non-negative. The inductive proof will establish and use an upper bound on the
average probability for a link. We now continue with the details of the formal proof. On one hand,
PSCd (n,m,P)
= ∑
j∈[m]
BF(〈p1j , . . . , pnj 〉, d)

∑
j∈[m]
BF
(
j (P)
rj
, rj , 
d
)
(by Lemma 2.3)
= ∑
j∈[m]
∑
t∈[d]
(
j (P)
rj
)t · S(d, t) · (rj )t (by Proposition 2.2)
= ∑
t∈[d]
S(d, t)·
( ∑
j∈[m]
(
j (P)
rj
)t ·(rj )t) (by changing order of summation).
On the other hand,
PSCd (n,m,F)
= m · ∑
t∈[d]
(
1
m
)t
· S(d, t) · nt (by Corollary 3.2)
= ∑
t∈[d]
S(d, t) · mt · n
t
nt
.
So, clearly,
PSCd (n,m,F) − PSCd (n,m,P)
∑
t∈[d]
S(d, t) · (t),
where for each integer t ∈ [d],
(t) = mt · n
t
nt
− ∑
j∈[m]
(
j (P)
rj
)t
· (rj )t .
We prove:
Lemma 4.2. For each integer t1, (t)0.
Proof. Assume, without loss of generality, that for each integer t ∈ [d], for each link j ∈ [m], rj  t (since otherwise
r
t
j = 0 and (t) can only increase). The proof is by induction on t. For the basis case where t = 1, note that
(1) = m− ∑
j∈[m]
j (P)
rj
· rj
= n − ∑
j∈[m]
j (P )
= 0
as needed.
M. Gairing et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 369 (2006) 116–135 127
Assume inductively that the claim holds for (t − 1), for some integer t2. For the induction step, we will prove the
claim for t. We ﬁrst prove a preliminary claim:
Lemma 4.3. For each integer t2, for each link j ∈ [m] such that rj  t ,
j (P)
rj
(rj − (t − 1)) · n − (t − 1)
n
.
Proof. Fix a link j ∈ [m] and a user i ∈ [n] such that 0 < pij j (P)/rj . (Clearly, such a user exists.) Since P is a
Nash equilibrium and pij > 0, it follows that for each link  ∈ [m], ICij (P) ICi(P), or j (P) − pij (P) − pi.
Since pij j (P)/rj , it follows that j (P) − pij j (P) −j (P)/rj = ((rj − 1)/rj )j (P). Hence, it follows that
rj − 1
rj
j (P)(P) − pi.
Summing up over all links  ∈ [m] yields that∑
∈[m]
rj − 1
rj
j (P) 
∑
∈[m]
((P) − pi) = ∑
∈[m]
(P) − ∑
∈[m]
pi = n − 1.
Since rj  t and t2, rj 2. Hence, it follows that
j (P)
n − 1
m
· rj
rj − 1 .
Since rj  t , rj − (t − 1) > 0; hence, it follows that
j (P)
rj
(rj − (t − 1)) n − 1
m
· rj − (t − 1)
rj − 1 .
Note that for each link j ∈ [m], the fraction (rj − (t − 1))/(rj − 1) is monotonically increasing in rj (since t2);
since rj n, it follows that (rj − (t − 1))/(rj − 1)(n − (t − 1))/(n − 1). Hence, it follows that
j (P)
rj
(rj − (t − 1))  n − 1
m
· n − (t − 1)
n − 1 =  ·
n − (t − 1)
n
as needed. 
We are now ready to prove that (t)0. Clearly,
∑
j∈[m]
(
j (P)
rj
)t · (rj )t
= ∑
j∈[m]
j (P)
rj
(rj − (t − 1))
(
j (P)
rj
)t−1 · (rj )(t−1)

∑
j∈[m]
 · n−(t−1)
n
·
(
j (P)
rj
)t−1 · (rj )(t−1) (by Lemma 4.3)
=  · n−(t−1)
n
∑
j∈[m]
(
j (P)
rj
)t−1 · (rj )(t−1)
 · n−(t−1)
n
· mt−1 · n(t−1)
nt−1 (by induction hypothesis)
= mt · nt
nt
.
This implies that (t)0, as needed. 
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Lemma 4.2 implies now the claim. 
4.2. The MPoA and PPoA
We prove:
Theorem 4.4. Consider the case of identical users. Then, MPoABd .
Proof. Fix any instance 〈n,m〉 with an associated fully mixed Nash equilibrium F. By Corollary 3.2,
PSCd (n,m,F) = m ·
∑
t∈[d]
(
1
m
)t
· S(d, t) · nt  m · ∑
t∈[d]
(
1
m
)t
· S(d, t) · nt .
We now proceed by case analysis.
1. Assume ﬁrst that nm. Recall that in this case, POPTd (w,m)m · (n/m)d . Hence,
PSCd (n,m,F)
POPTd (n,m)
 1
m
· (m
n
)d · m · ∑
t∈[d]
( 1
m
)t · S(d, t) · nt
= ∑
t∈[d]
(
m
n
)d−t · S(d, t)

∑
t∈[d]
S(d, t) (since mn)
= Bd.
2. Assume now that n < m. Recall that, in this case, POPTd (n,m) = n. Hence,
PSCd (n, n,F)
POPTd (n,m)
 1
n
m · ∑
t∈[d]
( 1
m
)t · S(d, t) · nt
= ∑
t∈[d]
(
n
m
)t−1 · S(d, t)
<
∑
t∈[d]
S(d, t) (since n < m)
= Bd.
So, in all cases, PSCd (n,m,F)/POPTd (n,m)Bd . Theorem 4.1 implies now the claim. 
By Lemma 3.1, Theorem 4.4 immediately implies:
Corollary 4.5. Consider the case of identical users. Then, PPoA∑2 td Bt .
We next consider the special case of (identical users and) two links. We prove:
Theorem 4.6. Consider the case of identical users and two links. Then,
MPoA2d−2
(
1 +
(
1
n
)d−1)
.
This bound is tight for n = 2.
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Proof. We start with the upper bound. Fix any instance 〈n, 2〉 with an associated Nash equilibrium P. Clearly,
PSCd (n, 2,P)
PSCd (n, 2,F) (by Theorem 4.1)
= 2 · ∑
t∈[d]
( 1
2
)t · S(d, t) · nt (by Corollary 3.2)
2 ·
(
1
2 · S(d, 1) · n + 14 ·
∑
2 td
S(d, t)nt
)
(since ( 12 )t  14 for t2)
= 2 · ( 12 · S(d, 1) · n + 14 · (nd − S(d, 1) · n))
(
since nd = ∑
t∈[d]
S(d, t)nt
)
= 2 ·
(
n
4 + n
d
4
)
(since S(d, 1) = 1).
On the other hand, POPTd (n, 2)2 · ( n2 )d . It follows that
PSCd (w, 2,F)
POPTd (w, 2)

(
2
n
)d
·
(
n
4
+ n
d
4
)
= 2d−2
(
1 +
(
1
n
)d−1)
as needed.
To prove that the upper bound is tight for n = 2, note that for n = 2 it becomes 2d−2 + 12 . We continue to prove that
this is also a lower bound for n = 2. Fix an instance 〈2, 2〉. Then, POPTd (n,m) = 2, while
PSCd (w,m,F)
= 2 · ∑
t∈[d]
(
1
2
)t
· S(d, t) · 2t (by Corollary 3.2)
= 2 ·
(
1
2
· S(d, 1) · 2 + 1
4
· S(d, 2) · 2 · 1
)
(since 2t = 0 for t3)
= 2 ·
(
S(d, 1) + 1
2
· S(d, 2)
)
= 2 ·
(
1 + 1
2
· (2d−1 − 1)
)
(since S(d, 1) = 1 and S(d, 2) = 2d−1 − 1)
= 2 ·
(
2d−2 + 1
2
)
.
It follows that MPoA2d−2 + 12 , which establishes the claimed tightness. 
By Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 4.6, we obtain:
Corollary 4.7. Consider the case of identical users and two links. Then,
PPoA2d−1 − 1 + d − 1
n
.
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Proof. Clearly,
PPoA

∑
2 td
2t−2
(
1 + ( 1
n
)t−1) (by Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 4.6)
= ∑
0 td−2
2t + 1
n
∑
0 td−2
( 2
n
)t
2d−1 − 1 + d−1
n
(
since
2
n
1 for n2
)
as needed. 
5. Pure Nash equilibria
We ﬁrst recall some technical deﬁnition from [20]. For a given instance 〈w,m〉, call a user i ∈ [n] bursty
[20, Section 3] if wi > W/m. Intuitively, the trafﬁc of a bursty user exceeds the fair share of trafﬁc for a link.
Say that an instance 〈w,m〉 is bursty if some user i ∈ [n] is bursty; else, 〈w,m〉 is non-bursty. We ﬁrst prove a simple
property of bursty users.
Lemma 5.1. A bursty user is solo in an optimal assignment.
Proof. Fix an instance 〈w,m〉 with bursty user i ∈ [n]; so, wi > W/m. Consider an optimal assignment Q =
〈q1, . . . , qn〉. Note that qi (Q)wi . Since i is bursty, it follows that qi (Q) > W/m. Since
∑
j∈[m] j (Q) = W ,
there is some other link j ∈ [m] with j 
= qi such that j (Q) < W/m. Thus, j (Q) < wi . Assume now, by way of
contradiction, that some user k 
= i is assigned to link qi . Modify Q to obtain Q′ by switching user k to link j. Then,
PSCd ()(w,m,Q′) − PSCd ()(w,m,Q)
= ∑
t∈[d]
at ((qi (Q′))t + (j (Q′))t − (qi (Q))t − (j (Q))t )
= ∑
t∈[d]
at ((qi (Q′))t + (j (Q) + wk)t − (qi (Q′) + wk)t − (j (Q))t )
<
∑
t∈[d]
at ((qi (Q′) + wk)t + (j (Q) + wk − wk)t − (qi (Q′) + wk)t − (j (Q))t ) (by Lemma 2.1)
= 0.
Since Q is optimum, PSCt (w,m,Q′)PSCt (w,m,Q), a contradiction. 
The following two simple properties of bursty users in pure Nash equilibria were shown in [20, Section 3]; they carry
over to our model since their sets of Nash equilibria coincide.
Lemma 5.2. A bursty user is solo in a pure Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 5.3. Consider a pure Nash equilibrium P for a non-bursty instance 〈w,m〉. Then, for each link j ∈ [m],
j (P)2min∈[m] (L).
We are now ready to prove:
Theorem 5.4. For pure Nash equilibria,
MPoA = (2
d − 1)d
(d − 1)(2d − 2)d−1
(
d − 1
d
)d
.
In our proof, we will make use of the following notations. Consider an instance 〈w,m〉 with an associated pure
assignment L. Fix a set of links L, inducing a set of users U that are assigned by L to links in L. Then, w \ U and
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m \L denote the trafﬁc vector and the number of links resulting from w and m, respectively, by respective eliminations
of all entries corresponding to users in U and links in L. Also, L \ (U,L) denotes the assignment induced by these
eliminations. We are now ready for the proof.
Proof. We ﬁrst prove the upper bound. Consider any arbitrary instance 〈w,m〉 with associated pure Nash equilibrium
L = 〈1, . . . , n〉 and optimal assignment Q = 〈q1, . . . , qn〉. Denote (L) = min∈[m] (L). We distinguish between
two cases:
1. The instance 〈w,m〉 is non-bursty: Recall that in this case, by Lemma 5.3, for each link j ∈ [m], j (L)2(L).
So, transform the set of loads {(L) |  ∈ [m]} into a new set of loads {̂ |  ∈ [m]} as the output of the following
repetitive procedure:
for each link  ∈ [m] do
̂ ← (L);
while there are distinct links j1, j2 ∈ [m] with (L) < ̂j1  ̂j2 < 2(L) do⎛⎝ ̂j1
̂j2
⎞⎠ ← ( ̂j1 − min{̂j1 − (L), 2(L) − ̂j2 }
̂j2 + min{̂j1 − (L), 2(L) − ̂j2 }
)
.
Intuitively, our transformation procedure chooses at each step two intermediate latencies ̂j1 and ̂j2 (that is, two
latencies that are not yet pushed either to the upper or to the lower end of the interval of link loads). It transfers the
(strictly) positive quantity min{̂j1 − (L), 2(L) − ̂j2} from the small latency ̂j1 to the large latency ̂j2 . Clearly,
each step of the procedure either pushes the small latency ̂j1 to the lower end (L) of the interval of link latencies,
or pushes the large load ̂j2 to the upper end 2(L) of the interval of link latencies (or both). So, clearly, when the
procedure terminates, there is at most one intermediate latency. Hence, by reordering links, we obtain that for some
integer k ∈ [m − 1] ∪ {0}, for each link j ∈ [m],
̂j =
⎧⎨⎩
2(L) if j ∈ [k]
(1 + x)(L) if j = k + 1
(L) if j ∈ [m] \ [k + 1],
where 0x < 1. Intuitively, k is the number of overloaded links. Note that
∑
j∈[m] ̂j = k · 2(L) + (1 + x) · (L) +
(m − (k + 1)) · (L) = (m + k + x) · (L).
Note that this transformation procedure maps a set of latencies to a new set of latencies, without explicitly mapping
an instance to a new instance. However, for the sake of our analysis, we will also consider that the procedure maps an
instance 〈w,m〉 and a Nash equilibrium L to a new instance 〈ŵ,m〉 and a new Nash equilibrium L̂. Note also that this
transformation preserves (at each of its steps) the sum of latencies. Hence, it also preserves the total latencies, so that
W = Ŵ . Clearly, for each link j ∈ [m], j (L̂) = ̂j . Hence, it follows that∑j∈[m] j (L̂) = (m + k + x) · (L).
For any individual step of our repetitive procedure, Lemma 2.1 implies that
PSCd (ŵ,m, L̂) − PSCd (w,m,L)
= ((̂j1 − min{̂j1 − (L), 2(L) − ̂j2})d + (̂j2 + min{̂j1 − (L), 2(L) − ̂j2})d) − ((̂j1)d − (̂j2)d)
> 0.
Hence, it follows that,
PSCd (w,m,L)  PSCd (ŵ,m, L̂)
= ∑
j∈[m]
(j (L̂))d
= k(2(L))d+((1+x)(L))d+(m−k−1)(L)d=(m+(2d−1)k−1+(1+x)d)(L)d .
On the other hand,
POPTd (w,m)  m
(
W
m
)d
= Ŵ
d
md−1
=
(∑
j∈[m] j (L̂)
)d
md−1
= (m + k + x)
d(L)d
md−1
.
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It follows that
PPoA (m + (2
d − 1)k − 1 + (1 + x)d)md−1
(m + k + x)d .
Deﬁne the real function
f (k) = (m + (2
d − 1)k − 1 + (1 + x)d)md−1
(m + k + x)d
of a real variable k. (The quantity x is taken as a parameter, while m is a ﬁxed constant.) Clearly, MPoA supk f (k).
So, we will determine supk f (k).
To gain some intuition about the function f (k) and its supremum, observe that the value of x is not really important
for the upper bound; so, consider that x = 0. Setting then y = k/m, so that 0 < y1, the resulting function g(y) may
be written as g(y) = (1 + (2d − 1)y)/(y + 1)d . It may be easily veriﬁed that g(y) has a unique maximum y0 in (0, 1],
where y0 = (2d − 1− d)/(2d − 1)(d − 1). The presence of x in g(k) will result in a bit more complicated calculations.
We now continue with the details of the formal proof.
To maximize the function f (k), observe that the ﬁrst and second derivatives of f (k) are
f ′(k) = (2
d − 1)md−1
(m + k + x)d −
(m + (2d − 1)k − 1 + (1 + x)d)md−1d
(m + k + x)d+1
and
f ′(k) = m
d−1d((2d − 1)(d − 1)k − 2(2d − 1)(m + x) + (m − 1 + (1 + x)d)(d + 1))
(m + k + x)d+2 ,
respectively. The only root of f ′(k) is
k0 = (2
d − 1)(m + x) + d(−m + 1 − (1 + x)d)
(2d − 1)(d − 1) .
For k = k0, the second derivative evaluates to
f ′(k0) = m
d−1d(−m(2d − 2) − (2d − 1)x + (1 + x)d − 1)
(m + k0 + x)d+2 .
Since −(2d − 1)x + (1 + x)d2d holds for all x ∈ [0, 1], it follows that f ′(k0) < 0. Thus, k0 is a local maximum of
the function f (k). Since f (k) is a continuous function with a single extreme point that is a local maximum, it follows
that
f (k)  f (k0)
= (2
d − 1)d
d − 1
(
d − 1
d
)d
· m
d−1
(m(2d − 2) + x(2d − 1) − (1 + x)d + 1)d−1 .
Note that the minimum value of the function h(x) = x(2d −1)− (1+x)d +1 for x ∈ [0, 1] is h(0) = h(1) = 0. Thus,
f (k)  (2
d − 1)d
d − 1 ·
(
d − 1
d
)d
· m
d−1
(m(2d − 2))d−1 =
(2d − 1)d
(d − 1)(2d − 2)d−1
(
d − 1
d
)d
as needed.
2. The instance 〈w,m〉 is bursty: We remark that Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2 imply that the existence of bursty users cannot
increase the PPoA since their assignment in a Nash equilibrium coincides with that in an optimal assignment.
Denote as U the (non-empty) set of bursty users. Recall that, by Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2, U induces sets of solo links
LL and LQ for the Nash equilibrium L and the optimal assignment Q, respectively, so that |LL| = |U | and |LQ| = |U |.
Since links are identical, we assume that LL = LQ = L, with |L|1. So,
PSCd (w,m,L) =
∑
j∈L
(j (L))d + PSCd (w \ U, [m] \ L,L \ (U,L))
= ∑
i∈U
wdi + PSCd (w \ U, [m] \ L,L \ (U,L))
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and
POPTd (w,m) = PSCd (w,m,Q)
= ∑
j∈L
(j (L))d + PSCd (w \ U, [m] \ L,Q \ (U,L))
= ∑
i∈U
wdi + PSCd (w \ U, [m] \ L,Q \ (U,L)).
Note ﬁrst that the assignment L \ (U,L) is a Nash equilibrium for the instance 〈w \ U, [m] \ L〉. Moreover, since Q
is an optimal assignment for the instance 〈w,m〉, it follows that Q \ (U,L) is an optimal assignment for the instance
〈w \ U, [m] \ L〉, so that
PSCd (w \ U, [m] \ L,Q \ (U,L)) = POPTd (w \ U, [m] \ L).
Thus,
POPTd (w,m) =
∑
i∈U
wdi + POPTd (w \ U, [m] \ L).
It follows that
PSCd (w,m,L)
POPTd (w,m)
=
∑
i∈U wdi + PSCd (w \ U, [m] \ L,L \ (U,L))∑
i∈U wdi + POPTd (w \ U, [m] \ L)

PSCd (w \ U, [m] \ L,L \ (U,L))
POPTd (w \ U, [m] \ L)
.
Consider the smaller instance 〈w\U, [m]\L〉 and the associatedNash equilibriumL\(U,L). There are two possibilities
depending on whether 〈w \ U, [m] \ L〉 is bursty or not.
• Assume ﬁrst that the instance 〈w\U, [m] \L〉 is non-bursty. Then, we are reduced to the previous case of non-bursty
instances and the upper bound follows.
• Assume now that the smaller instance 〈w \U, [m] \L〉 is bursty.We repeatedly identify the set of bursty users for the
smaller instance, and we reduce this smaller instance to an even smaller instance that may be bursty or non-bursty.
This procedure eventually yields a non-bursty instance (even the trivial one with one user), and the claim for the
original bursty instance follows inductively.
The proof of the upper bound is now complete.
We continue to prove the lower bound. Construct an instance 〈w,m〉 as follows. There are m = (2d − 1)(d − 1)
links. There are 2(2d − d − 1) heavy users with trafﬁc 1; there are m · (m − (2d − d − 1)) light users with trafﬁc 1/m.
Consider now the following assignments:
• In the pure assignment L, heavy users are evenly distributed to 2d − d − 1 links; light users are evenly distributed
to the remaining m − (2d − d − 1) links. Clearly, L is a Nash equilibrium with
PSCd (w,m,L) = 2d · (2d − d − 1) + 1d · ((2d − 1)(d − 1) − (2d − d − 1)) = (2d − 1)(2d − 2).
• In the pure assignment Q, each (of 2(2d − d − 1)) heavy user is assigned solo to each of 2(2d − d − 1) links;
m(m− 2(2d −d − 1)) light users are evenly assigned to the remaining m−2(2d − d − 1) links, while the remaining
m(2d − d − 1) light users are evenly assigned to all m links. It is easy to see that the latency on each link induced
by Q is 1 + (2d − d − 1)/m = (m + 2d − d − 1)/m. Thus,
PSCd (w,m,Q) = m ·
(
m + 2d − d − 1
m
)d
= (d − 1)(2
d − 2)d
(2d − 1)d−1 ·
(
d
d − 1
)d
.
Thus,
MPoA 
PSCd (w,m,L)
PSCd (w,m,Q)
= (2
d − 1)d
(d − 1)(2d − 2)d−1 ·
(
d − 1
d
)d
as needed. 
By Lemma 3.1, Theorem 5.4 immediately implies:
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Corollary 5.5. For pure Nash equilibria.
PPoA
∑
2 td
(2t − 1)t
(t − 1)(2t − 2)t−1
(
t − 1
t
)t
.
6. Epilogue
We introduced and analyzed an interesting variant of the well studied KP model [19] for selﬁsh routing that reﬂects
some inﬂuence from the much older Wardrop model [29]. Our analysis highlights some interesting connections to
classical combinatorial numbers such as the Stirling numbers of the second kind [28] and the Bell numbers [5]. In
particular, we formulated and proved the validity of the PFMNE conjecture. In turn, this validity was instrumental for
proving (sometimes tight) bounds on MPoA; these immediately implied upper bounds on PPoA.
Several interesting problems remain open. On the most concrete level, we do not yet know any lower bounds on
PPoA. Are our upper bounds tight? We are also missing general bounds on MPoA and PPoA (ones that hold for
arbitrary users, for an arbitrary number of links and for all (mixed) Nash equilibria). Proving such bounds remains a
very challenging open problem.
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